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INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1034: SALE
OF A RESIDENCE TO A RELATED CORPORATION
- A VIABLE STRATEGY?
Tax attorneys and accountants recently have devised a tax stra-
tegy by which a homeowner, desiring to sell his old principal resi-
dence but unable to do so because of a buyer's market, can over-
come the two-year limitation period of Internal Revenue Code
section 1034. The strategy requires the formation of a legitimate
corporation to act as the buyer and the transfer of the home-
owner's old principal residence to the newly formed corporation to
be recognized as a sale. However, the newly formed corporation is
likely to be disregarded and in the event that it is not disregarded,
the transfer is likely to be characterized as a section 351 transfer
or a capital contribution, not a sale. Consequently, under both the
current tax law and the proposed Tax Reform Act of 1986, such a
tax strategy will not prove to be a viable means of overcoming
section 1034s two-year limitation period.
INTRODUCTION
Subject to certain limitations, Internal Revenue Code (Code) sec-
tion 10341 allows a taxpayer to postpone recognition of a gain from
the sale of an old principal residence when the sale occurs within two
years of the purchase of a new principal residence.2 This provision
was enacted to eliminate the hardship faced by a homeowner having
to pay taxes on a gain which was to be reinvested in a new home.
1. I.R.C. § 1034 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
2. Under section 1034(a), gain need not be recognized to the extent that the
taxpayer's cost of purchasing a new residence is equal to or greater than the adjusted
sales price of the old residence. "Adjusted Sales Price" is defined under section 1034(b);
explanation of the computation can be found in Treasury Regulation Section 1.1034-
1(c)(2). To the extent that gain is realized (when the sales price of the old residence,
minus selling and fixing-up expenses, exceeds the taxpayer's basis) but is not recognized,
the basis of the new residence is decreased by the amount of gain not recognized. Thus,
the amount of gain not recognized from the sale of the old residence will not be taxed
until the new residence is sold.
3. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE
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Although section 1034 is designed to help the taxpayer, the two-year
limitation period has prevented many homeowners, unable to sell
their homes within that time, from taking advantage of the provi-
sion. Consequently, a recent trend of utilizing a sale-to-a-related-cor-
poration tax plan (Plan) has emerged in these situations.
The Plan is best illustrated by a hypothetical. Assume T (a home-
owner under the age of 55)4 bought a home for $100,000 in 1975. T
paid $25,000 in cash and took out a mortgage for the remaining
balance of $75,000, at an interest rate of 10% per annum. In 1983 T
buys a new home for $300,000 and puts his old home on the market.
In 1985 near the expiration of the section 1034 two-year limitation
period, T still is unable to find a buyer for his old home. Thus, T
forms a wholly owned 5 corporation (X), adhering to all corporate
formalities (such as filing corporate tax returns, maintaining a cor-
porate checking account and designating corporate officers). T con-
tributes $10,000 to X's working capital' in exchange for all of X's
stock.7 Furthermore, T elects to operate X as an "S" corporation.,
Subsequently, within the section 1034 two-year limitation period, T
sells his old residence to X at the fair market value of $250,000. X
assumes T's mortgage (by 1985 the principal has decreased from
$75,000 to $50,000) and issues five promissory notes to X, each in
the principal amount of $40,000 and bearing interest at the rate of
10% per annum.9 The first note is payable one year from the sales
CONo. & AD. NEWS 1781, 1808; S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 34-35, reprinted
In 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1969, 2004.
4. For purposes of this Comment, T is assumed to be younger than 55 years of
age; otherwise, I.R.C. § 121 (West 1984) also would need to be consulted.
5. As used in the text, a corporation is wholly owned when all of its stock is
owned, be it actual or constructive ownership, by one person.
6. Working capital, as referred to in the text, is the amount of cash available to
pay for X's operational expenses, including maintenance, property insurance, and prop-
erty taxes.
7. Under I.R.C. § 118(a) (West 1984) capital contribution to a corporation does
not result in gross income to the corporation. Similarly, under I.R.C. § 1032(a) (West
Supp. 1986), "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of
money or other property in exchange for stock ... of such corporation."
8. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (West Supp. 1986). Generally, under sec-
tion 1361, a corporation with no more than 35 shareholders and no more than one class
of stock may elect to be an "S" corporation under section 1362. The primary advantage
of such an election is the avoidance of double taxation and the ability to pass-thru corpo-
rate losses. That is, each shareholder reports his pro rata share of the corporation's gains
or losses on his individual tax return, thereby avoiding tax at the corporate level, or, in
the event of a loss, the loss is deducted against the taxpayer's personal income.
9. For the purpose of this Comment, it is assumed that a 10% interest rate is
adequate under I.R.C. § 483 (West Supp. 1986), amended by Amendments to Imputed
Interest Rules, Pub. L. No. 99-121, § 101, 99 Stat. 505, 505-09 (1985); cf. Act of Oct.
31, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-612, § 2, 98 Stat. 3180, 3182-85 (in real estate installment sale
contracts entered into after 1984, but before July 1, 1985, if no interest rate is specified
and section 483 applies, a 10% rate is imputed). Under section 483, the lack of an ade-
quate interest rate results in a recharacterization of a portion of the principal as interest
(referred to as the "unstated interest"); consequently, the purchaser's basis in the prop-
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date, with each successive note maturing at one-year intervals. The
old residence, which X acquired, then is rented at its fair market
value of $1200 per month for a few years until it is sold to a third-
party buyer. During each of these rental years, X deducts $5000 for
expenses,10 approximately $25,000 for interest payments,"1 and
$10,000 for depreciation (assuming a useful life of twenty-five years,
calculated under the straight-line method). 2 The difference between
erty is decreased by the amount of the unstated interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(a)(1)(i)
(1966). Assuming the property is depreciable, such decrease in basis would lead to
smaller depreciation deductions.
10. Expenses include property taxes, property insurance, and costs of maintaining
the property. Property taxes are deductible under I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (West 1978). Prop-
erty insurance and maintenance costs may be deducted under I.R.C. § 162(a) (West
1978) when such expenses are "ordinary and necessary" to the carrying on of a "trade or
business." See, e.g., Ohio County & Indep. Agriculture Socy's, Del. County Fair, 51
T.C.M. (P-H) T 82-210, at 876 (1982) (the renting of a single parcel of real estate
qualifies as a "trade or business"); Waldheim Realty & Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 245
F.2d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 1957) (insurance premiums are deductible business expenses);
James L. Dowsey, 9 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1 40,297, at 453 (1940) (property maintenance
costs are deductible business expenses).
11. The fact that part of the interest payment is owed to a related shareholder
does not preclude deductibility under LR.C. § 163(a) (West 1978) in cases in which a
bona fide debt exists. E.g., R-W Specialties, Inc., 50 T.C.M. (P-H) T 81,697 (1981); cf.
I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986) (interest owed to a related party may be deducted
only if the payor and the payee use the same accounting method with regard to the
interest payment(s)). Thus, the amount of interest deduction is 10% of $50,000 (princi-
pal of assumed mortgage) plus 10% of $200,000 (principal of total promissory note is-
sued by X). This in turn is equivalent to $5000 plus $20,000, respectively, yielding a
total deduction of $25,000 per year. For the purposes of this Comment, it is assumed
that $25,000 represents the annual interest deduction, although, the amount realistically
would be somewhat smaller in subsequent years due to the decrease in the amount of
principal owed on the mortgage.
12. Under both I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1986) and I.R.C. § 168(c)(1) (West
Supp. 1986) property may be depreciated if it is used in a trade or business or held for
the production of income. The difference between the two sections is that under section
168 a greater amount of depreciation per year may be deducted because the length of
time in which certain properties may be depreciated is shortened. For example, under
section 168, most real properties may be depreciated in 18 years; under section 167, the
period of depreciation is determined by the particular property's approximate useful life
which normally exceeds 18 years. Nonetheless, section 168 is subject to numerous limita-
tions, several of which are applicable in the hypothetical case.
First, under section 168(e)(1), depreciable property must be acquired after December
31, 1980. Second, for purposes of applying section 168, even property acquired after
1980 is not treated as such if at any time during 1980: 1) the purchaser was a corpora-
tion; and 2) the seller was at least a 10% shareholder in the purchaser-corporation. See
I.R.C. § 168(e)(4)(B), (D). Third, under subsection 168(e)(4)(C), if the acquisition of
the property constitutes a transfer subject to section 351, see infra text accompanying
notes 62-88, section 168 will not apply to the extent that the basis of the property is
determined by the transferor's basis. Thus, in the hypothetical case, section 168 is not
applicable not only because the acquisition is likely to constitute a section 351 transfer,
but also because T, an owner of more than 10% of X's outstanding stock, had owned the
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X's rental income and its allowable deductions yields an annual loss
of $25,600.13
From the above hypothetical transactions, it must be determined
whether T has succeeded in bringing the "sale" within the ambit of
section 1034 to produce a loss, deductible on his individual tax re-
turn. Arguably, T's sale of the house to X not only enabled T to
meet the section 1034 two-year limitation period but also permitted
T to transfer the property to X with a step-up in basis14 for deprecia-
tion. 15 The step-up in basis results in a significant increase of deduct-
ible depreciation - in this hypothetical, the step-up in basis has re-
sulted in an additional $6000 deductible depreciation per year.
16
property purchased by X in 1980. Consequently, depreciation is appropriately deter-
mined under section 167.
In determining the method of depreciation, the applicable provision is section 1670)(5)
which pertains to used, section 1250 property. Section 1250 property is defined as depre-
ciable property which is not included under section 1245(a)(3). I.R.C. § 1250(c) (West
1982). Section 1245(a)(3) excludes buildings, such as houses. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3) (West
1982 & Supp. 1986). Therefore, houses used as rentals are considered section 1250 prop-
erty. Under section 167(j)(6), property whose original use is later converted to a depre-
ciable use is considered "used" property. Thus, under section 167(j)(5), X may use the
straight-line method of depreciation - the basis of the property divided by the term of
useful life. Other accelerated depreciation methods also are available but will be subject
to section 1250 recapture rules to the extent that it is greater than the annual amount
allowed under the straight line method. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
It must be noted that if T had owned his residence after 1980, rather than after 1975,
and X had acquired the property sometime thereafter, X would be allowed to use section
168, assuming that the acquisition does not constitute a section 351 transfer. Neverthe-
less, section 168(")(10) limits the basis of depreciation to that of T's old basis (i.e.
$100,000). Furthermore, if the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is passed, under section 168,
residential rental property acquired after December 31, 1986 will be limited to the
straight-line method of depreciation over a period of 27.5 years. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., § 1802 (1986).




Gross income: $1200 x 12 months = (equals) $14,400. Thus, X's total allowable deduc-
tions of $40,000 exceed its gross income of $14,400 netting a loss of $25,600.
14. A "step-up" in basis refers to the new, higher basis in the property trans-
ferred. Under I.R.C. § 1012 (West 1982) the basis of property is the cost of such prop-
erty. Included in the term "cost" is the money paid and the amount of any mortgages.
See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Thus, assuming T incurred no expenses
in selling his old residence and that the transfer is not a section 351 exchange, the differ-
ence between $250,000 (the price received for his old residence) and $100,000 (the basis
of his old residence) resulted in a $150,000 step-up in basis for X.
15. Under I.R.C. § 1239 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986), gain from a transfer of
property, depreciable in the hands of the transferee, to a related party is characterized as
ordinary income to the transferor, not capital gain; however, since gain from a section
1034 transfer is not recognized, section 1239 does not apply until the transferor's new
residence is sold. See infra note 140. Additionally, if the Tax Reform Act of 1986 should
pass, section 1239 will continue to be relevant, since the distinction between capital gains
and ordinary income is referred to throughout various Code provisions.
16. Depreciation calculated under the straight-line method over a useful life of 25
years, with the old basis of $100,000, yields an annual depreciation deduction of $4000.
On the other hand, with the new basis of $250,000 the depreciation is increased to
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Accordingly, the higher amount of deductible depreciation contrib-
utes to a greater amount of total allowable deductions per year.
Moreover, because X is an "S" corporation, T, as X's sole share-
holder, may deduct the entire $25,600 loss against his personal in-
come on his individual tax return.
17
It should be noted that if the Tax Reform Act of 1986 passes,
rental activity will be considered a passive activity."8 Business and
interest expenses attributable to rental activity will not be included
in the determination of a passive activity's income or losses. Further-
more, loss deductions will not be permitted unless the passive activity
has net active income from which to be offset or the taxpayer owns
at least 10% of the interest in the passive activity and has an ad-
justed gross income of less than $150,000.1' (A taxpayer with ad-
justed gross income of $100,000 or less will be entitled to deduct up
to $25,000 in passive activity losses; a taxpayer with an adjusted
gross income exceeding $100,000 will be entitled to deduct losses
only to the extent of $25,000 less 50% of the adjusted gross income
exceeding $100,000 - that is, at an adjusted gross income of
$150,000 the exemption is phased out).20 Disallowed losses are car-
ried over to the succeeding taxable years and, upon disposition of the
taxpayer's entire interest in the passive activity, such losses can be
deducted against income in the following order: gain recognized on
the disposition, net income or gain from all passive activities, and
any other income or gain.2' Consequently, depending upon T's an-
nual adjusted gross income, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would limit
T's annual loss deduction - if not altogether postpone it - until T
disposes of his entire interest in the rental activity.
The advantages to be gained from implementing the Plan increase
$10,000, resulting in a difference of $6000.
17. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (West 1986) permits the pass-thru of a corporation's in-
come, losses, deductions, and credits to its shareholder(s); however, under section
1366(d)(1), a shareholder may take only so much of the losses and deductions as shall
not exceed his adjusted basis in the corporation's stock and any indebtedness of the cor-
poration to the shareholder. In our hypothetical, T's initial basis in the corporate stock is
$10,000 (the amount of T's initial capital contribution) and the basis of the indebtedness
owed to him by X is $200,000 (the cumulative total of the promissory notes). Thus, T
may continue to take losses and deductions so long as they are less than his combined
basis of $210,000 ($200,000 plus $10,000) less adjustments made under I.R.C. § 1367
(West Supp. 1986).






with the value and appreciation of the home (hereinafter "prop-
erty") sold.22 The Plan serves to benefit those taxpayers owning
highly appreciated property who are likely to be in the highest in-
come tax bracket.23 Moreover, although tax-minimization schemes
involving related parties frequently are attacked by the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS), the Plan appears to find some support from the
IRS. 24 Thus, for these high-bracket taxpayers, the Plan is an attrac-
tive tax saving strategy.
This Comment explores the Plan's legitimacy and viability as a
tax strategy. The Comment first discusses whether a Plan-devised
corporation will be recognized as a legitimate entity, separate from
the homeowner-taxpayer. If the corporation is not recognized as a
separate entity, the Plan becomes useless because it is premised upon
the corporation acting as the buyer. Second, the transfer of the
homeowner's property to the corporation is examined in light of sec-
tion 351,25 which is of particular importance in determining the ex-
tent, if any, of the tax benefits to be derived under the Plan. Third,
the Comment briefly explores the potential tax consequences likely
to follow when a third party buyer is found and a corporate sale
follows. Fourth, IRS Letter Ruling 8350084 is examined with re-
spect to its effect upon the legitimacy of the Plan. Ultimately, the
Comment concludes that under close analysis, the Plan-devised cor-
poration is neither a legitimate nor a viable tax saving strategy.
22. For example, if property with a fair market value and basis of $100,000 is
later sold at the appreciated fair market value of $150,000, the basis subject to deprecia-
tion has increased by $50,000. But if the property instead had appreciated to $300,000,
the basis subject to depreciation would increase by $200,000. Thus, the more a property
appreciates, the greater will be the basis subject to depreciation, and therefore the
greater the amount of depreciation deduction. Consequently, the higher the depreciation
deduction, the lower the income subject to taxation.
23. As an illustration, assume A and B each owns a home which has a basis and
fair market value of $50,000. Furthermore, assume A is in the 25% tax bracket and B is
in the 50% tax bracket. At the time of disposition, each home is sold at the fair market
value of $150,000. Each home has thus appreciated by $100,000 and, under I.R.C. §
1001(a) (West 1982), both A and B have realized a taxable gain of $100,000. Nonethe-
less, since a home does not fall within any of the categories excluded by section 1221's
definition of capital asset, A and B are entitled to treat the $100,000 as a capital gain.
Accordingly, under I.R.C. § 1202 (West 1982) A and B each may deduct 60% of the
gains, leaving an adjusted taxable gain of $40,000 ($100,000 - 60% of $100,000). Con-
sequently, A's tax is $10,000 (25% of $40,000) and B's tax is $20,000 (50% of $40,000).
On the same amount of gain/appreciation, B pays twice as much as A in taxes. There-
fore, given the same transaction, when gain is not recognized under section 1034, or
when a deductible loss results, B will save more than A in taxes.
24. LTR 8350084 (September 13, 1983). See infra notes 137-42 and accompany-
ing text.
25. I.R.C. § 351 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986). Generally, if a transfer is character-
ized as a section 351 exchange no gain or loss may be recognized on the transaction -
that is, there is no sale. See infra notes 62-88 and accompanying text for a further dis-
cussion of section 351 transfers.
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THE CORPORATION AS A SEPARATE ENTITY
As a general principle, a corporate entity is recognized rather than
disregarded for tax purposes.2 6 Nevertheless, the treatment of a cor-
poration as a separate entity frequently depends upon the existence
of a business purpose.2 Usually, courts have been lenient in finding
the existence of a business purpose and in thus upholding the corpo-
rate entity; however, it is important to note that such findings gener-
ally have occurred in cases in which the existence of a corporate
entity favors the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
(Commissioner).2 8 Moreover, the fact that a corporation is owned
wholly by one shareholder has not subjected the corporation to any
less recognition as a separate entity.29 But, if the existence of a cor-
porate entity is deemed a sham, an exception to the general principle
is recognized.30 Accordingly, if a newly formed corporation under
the Plan, as illustrated in the hypothetical, fails to satisfy the busi-
ness purpose requirement or is deemed a sham, the corporate entity
will not be recognized and thus cannot act as the buyer. Without the
Plan-devised corporation acting as the buyer, there is no sale. With-
out a sale, there is no gain. And without a gain, the taxpayer cannot
obtain the benefits of a stepped-up basis nor utilize section 1034's
nonrecognition provision. Consequently, the Plan would not be a via-
ble nor legitimate means of obtaining the tax benefits discussed
above.
26. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934); Moline Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943); Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d
227, 233 (5th Cir. 1970); Dooley v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1372, 1375
(1984).
27. Samuels, The Limited Role of Section 351 in Corporate Acquisitions, 60
TAXES 955, 967 (1982); Comment, The Business Purpose Doctrine: The Effect of Motive
on Federal Income Tax Liability, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1078, 1084 (1981). For a gen-
eral analysis of the development of the business purpose doctrine, see Lipnick, Business
Purpose and Income Taxes: From Gregory to Goldstein, 46 TAXES 698 (1968).
28. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
29. E.g., Burnett v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415, 419 (1932);
Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1983); Machinery Rental,
Inc. v. Herpel, 622 F.2d 709, 725 (5th Cir. 1980); Bendix Home Sys., Inc. v. Hurston
Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d 1039, 1042 (5th Cir. 1978); DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray
Fleming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. Roy L. Morgan,
Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 1969).
30. E.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935).
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The Business Purpose Requirement
Whether a corporation's existence as a separate entity will satisfy
the business purpose requirement will depend upon the character of
its activities.3' In Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,32 the
United States Supreme Court held that a corporation will be treated
as a separate entity if the corporation's "purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the
corporation . . . . 33 In National Investors Corp. v. Hoey,34 Judge
Learned Hand applied the Moline rationale, defining business activ-
ity as "some industrial, commercial, or other activity besides avoid-
ing taxation. 35 It can be observed from Judge Learned Hand's defi-
nition that a corporation's activities need not be substantial so long
as the corporation's purpose is not confined to tax avoidance.
In practice, the amount of business activity required of the corpo-
ration has been minimal.36 For example, in Britt v. United States,3
7
the taxpayer formed three corporations, one for each of his three
children, and subsequently transferred to each corporation an inter-
est in the taxpayer's fruit business. The corporations were formed for
three purposes: to encourage the taxpayer's children to become in-
volved in his business; to provide the taxpayer's children with a
source of income; and, to facilitate the taxpayer's estate planning.
3 8
After concluding that Moline required only a minimal level of busi-
ness activity, the court held that the corporations' executions of
mortgages, holding of stock, and accrual and disbursements of in-
come made in the corporate name, constituted sufficient business ac-
tivity to uphold the corporations as separate entities.39
In Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp.,4° the corporation was
formed to facilitate the distribution of the decedent's estate. In par-
ticular, the corporation's purposes were to hold title to specific prop-
erty which the decedent wished to preserve for her children, and to
distribute to these children the rent earned from the property. The
corporation's activities were limited to some ten directors' meetings
in which occasional modifications were made regarding the distribu-
tion of the rental income. In holding these activities sufficient, the
31. Some tax attorneys refer to this test as the "business activity" test.
32. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
33. Id. at 439.
34. 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
35. Id. at 468.
36, E.g., Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 24 (1976) ("The degree of corpo-
rate purpose and activity requiring recognition of the corporation as a separate entity is
extremely low.").
37. 431 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. Id. at 229.
39. Id. at 237.
40. 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1960).
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court noted that such activities were all that was required to carry
out the purpose for which the corporation was formed.41
And in a recent Tax Court case, Robert Delli Paoli,42 property
was transferred to the taxpayer's wholly owned corporation for the
sole purpose of limiting the taxpayer's personal liability to potential
creditors. Subsequently, the corporation sold the property. The tax
court held that the advantage gained by the taxpayer in avoiding
potential liability and the corporation's disposition of the property
was sufficient business activity to satisfy the requirements of
Moline.4
From the above cases it becomes clear that the business purpose
requirement may be satisfied if the corporation engages in activity
which, although minimal, is sufficient to carry out the purpose of the
corporation's being. Moreover, the creation of a corporation for the
purpose of shielding oneself from personal liability also may be suffi-
cient business activity. Both contentions may be made by our hypo-
thetical Plan-devised corporation. Nonetheless, the above cases can
be distinguished from the hypothetical because such cases involved
business-type properties, and the hypothetical essentially involves a
nonbusiness-type property (a residence) converted for commercial
usage (rental). Whether this is a viable distinction is uncertain: it
has yet to be asserted. In light of the current case law, however, it
appears that X is likely to succeed in satisfying the business purpose
requirement, unless of course the transaction is deemed a sham."
41. Id. at 399.
42. 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1292 (1985).
43. Id. at 1296; see also Dooley v. Commissioner 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1372, 1376-
77 (1984) ("Gene's express purpose in forming Enterprises was to shield himself from
personal liability. This is an advantage under Missouri law that he would not otherwise
have enjoyed without the intervention of the corporate form and is thus the equivalent of
business activity.").
44. E.g., Moline Properties, Inc., 319 U.S. at 439; Jan T. Williams, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) 846, 848 (1984). Additionally, if a wholly owned corporation transacts business
in the name of its sole shareholder and thereby binds such shareholder by its acts, it
theoretically may be disregarded on the basis that it is merely a nominee or alter-ego of
the shareholder. Dooley, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1378-79; see also National Carbide Corp.
v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 437 (1949). In recent years, however, courts have come
to reject disregarding a corporation on the basis of a nominee or alter-ego argument,
applying instead the business purpose doctrine. See Miller, The Nominee Conundrum:




It is well settled that a taxpayer has the right to structure a busi-
ness transaction in such a way as to minimize taxes, if not all to-
gether to avoid them." Nonetheless, if the taxpayer's exercise of his
right is motivated primarily or solely to avoid taxes,46 or if in sub-
stance the transaction is "created to contravene directly or indirectly
the policies of the Internal Revenue Code,' 47 the courts have held
the transaction to be a sham. In applying the sham transaction doc-
trine, courts look to the substance and not the mere form of the
transaction. 48 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]o permit the
true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalism,
which exists solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the
effective administration of the tax policies of Congress. '' 49
The classic illustration of the substance over form dichotomy can
be found in Gregory v. Helvering.50 Taxpayer, Gregory, sought to
transfer to herself certain stocks held by her existing wholly owned
corporation for the purpose of selling the same stocks to a third
party. As a means of diminishing the amount of taxes which would
accrue upon a direct transfer by way of a dividend, Gregory formed
a new corporation and transferred to it the desired stocks under the
guise of a reorganization. Six days after its inception, Gregory liqui-
dated the new corporation and distributed to herself the desired
stocks, taxable at the lower capital gain rate. Although the form of
Gregory's transactions complied with the literal language of the par-
ticular Code section, the Supreme Court held that the substance of
the transactions did not constitute a reorganization, as intended by
the Code, 51 and thus the Court disregarded the newly formed corpo-
45. E.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469; Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d
316, 319 (9th Cir. 1963); Jan T. Williams, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 848.
46. E.g., Shaw, 323 F.2d at 320.
47. Britt, 431 F.2d at 233.
48. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77
YALE L.J. 440 (1968).
49. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
50. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
51. In Gregory, the court indicated:
the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax
motive, was the thing which the statute intended . . . . When subdivision (B)
speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation to another, it means a transfer
made "in pursuance of a plan of reorganization" [section 112(g)] of corporate
business; and not a transfer of assets by one corporation to another in pursu-
ance of a plan having no relation to the business of either, as plainly is the case
here. . . . [W]hat . . . we find . . . [is] a mere device which put on the form
of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character,
and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a
preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to
transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner.
Id, at 469.
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rate entity.
52
A corporation was held to be a sham for purposes of a specific
transaction in Higgins v. Smith. In Smith, the taxpayer "sold" cer-
tain stocks to his wholly owned corporation and claimed a loss on his
tax return. Recognizing the transaction as a mere paper loss, the
Supreme Court noted that the "domination and control is so obvious
in a wholly owned corporation as to require a peremptory instruction
that no loss in the statutory sense could occur upon a sale by a tax-
payer to such an entity. ' 54 Subsequently, Congress codified the
Smith decision in section 26755 which prohibits the recognition of a
loss from the sale of property between certain related parties, includ-
ing an individual and his wholly owned corporation.
56
The principle underlying the Gregory and Smith decisions is that
arrangements which distort and defeat the basic purpose for which a
claimed deduction, credit, or allowance was created may be disre-
garded. In Gregory, the taxpayer claimed an allowance which was
permissible only in a bona fide reorganization. Since the taxpayer's
formation of a new corporation, liquidated six days later, was held
not to be a reorganization within the intent of the Code, permitting
such an allowance would distort and defeat the basic purpose for
which the allowance was created. Similarly, in Smith, the basic pur-
pose of the claimed deduction was to offset a taxpayer's business
losses. Since the taxpayer's losses in Smith were manufactured, as
opposed to actually incurred, no deduction could be permitted with-
out distorting and defeating the purpose of the loss deduction.
The above principle has been codified under section 26957 and has
been addressed in the accompanying regulations. 8 For the purposes
of this Comment, section 269 generally disallows a taxpayer's claim
for a deduction, credit or other allowance which otherwise is made
possible by acquiring control of a corporation of which the principal
52. Id. at 470.
53. 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
54. Id. at 476.
55. I.R.C. § 267 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986).
56. Id. § 267(b)(2).
57. I.R.C. § 269 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986). As stated in S. REP. No. 627, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1943),
the legal effect of the section is, in large, to codify and emphasize the general
principle set forth in Higgins v. Smith, . . . and in other judicial decisions, as
to the ineffectiveness of arrangements distorting or perverting deductions, cred-
its, or allowances so that they no longer bear a reasonable business relationship
to the interests or enterprises which produced them and for the benefit of which
they were provided.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-2(b) (1962).
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purpose of the acquisition is tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is the
principal purpose if it "outranks or exceeds in importance, any other
one purpose.
'59
Analyzed under the sham transaction doctrine, certain aspects of
the Plan indicate that X may be disregarded as a corporation in its
"sale" transaction with T. First, in all likelihood and reasonableness,
the intent of section 1034 is to allow nonrecognition of gains in in-
stances involving a taxpayer and an unrelated party or a related
party if the evidence suggests an arms-length transaction. It is
doubtful that section 1034, requiring a sale or exchange, ever was
intended to encompass those transfers between a taxpayer and his
newly formed, wholly owned corporation. This is true especially in
cases in which the corporation acquires the property in order to en-
gage in a loss producing business. A transaction between such par-
ties compels the conclusion that the transfer was anything but arms-
length.
Second, T's creation of a corporate entity enabled T to produce
and claim a deductible loss as economically unreal as that claimed in
Smith. As an illustration, without the corporate entity to act as a
buyer, the only deductions to which T would be entitled are $5000
for maintenance expenses, $5000 for interest paid on the original
mortgage, and $4000 for depreciation ($100,000 basis divided by a
useful life of 25 years). 60 The difference between the rental income
($14,400) and the allowable deductions ($14,000) yields a gain of
$400. By forming a corporate entity and selling to it highly appreci-
ated property, T has created a deductible loss out of an otherwise
taxable gain. Such an arrangement is analogous to what the Su-
preme Court in Smith described as "simply 'a transfer by Mr.
Smith's left hand, being his individual hand, into his right hand, be-
ing his corporate hand, so that in truth and fact there was no trans-
fer at all.' "11
Third, X was formed for the principal purpose, if not the sole pur-
pose, of avoiding taxes. In particular, X is used as a vehicle to obtain
section 1034 benefits and to create a step-up in basis for deprecia-
tion. Consequently, T's transaction may come within the ambit of
section 269. Thus, notwithstanding IRS Letter Ruling 8350084, dis-
cussed below, and the possibility that X may satisfy the business
purpose requirement, the tax avoidance purposes inherent in the
Plan coupled with the opposite intentions of section 1034 implicate a
probable application of the sham transaction doctrine.
59. S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1943).
60. See supra notes 10-12 for authority supporting the deductibility of such
expenses.
61. Smith, 308 U.S. at 475.
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BONA FIDE SALE V. SECTION 351 TRANSFER
If a Plan-devised corporation is deemed legitimate because it satis-
fies the business purpose requirement and is not subject to the sham
transaction doctrine, its "sale" transaction still may be subject to
attack under section 351. Section 351(a) provides that
[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corpora-
tion by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in
such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or per-
sons are in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation.
6 2
At the outset, it is necessary to note that the control addressed in
section 351 need not be a result of the transfer if the transferor al-
ready was in control of the corporation prior to the exchange.63 In a
wholly owned corporation consisting of one shareholder, the control
element always is satisfied. 64 Thus, whether a transaction falls under
section 351 more often than not has turned upon the interpretation
of "securities."
Litigation involving interpretation of the term "securities" often
arises in section 351 cases. Whether a debt incurred on an apparent
sale should be characterized as a section 351 security or a bona fide
debt is one of the most frequently litigated issues. Ordinarily, the
issue arises when the taxpayer has transferred property to his wholly
owned corporation in the form of a sale, and, subsequently, the cor-
poration takes depreciation deductions at the higher purchase price
basis (as opposed to the transferor's basis) and/or sells the property,
claiming gain as the difference between its purchase price and the
sales price. In these instances, the IRS maintains that a transfer
which a shareholder has treated as a sale is in reality a transfer of
property for securities. 65 Additionally, due to the similarity in analy-
sis, the IRS also may argue that the transfer should be treated as a
capital contribution. 6
If a transfer is classified as a section 351 exchange, and not a sale,
the corporation's basis in the property received, under section
62. I.R.C. § 351(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1986).
63. B. BITrKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 3.08, at 3-33 (abr. 4th ed. 1979).
64. I.R.C. § 368(c) (West Supp. 1986) defines "control" as owning 80% or more
of the voting stock and 80% or more of all other classes of stock. In a wholly owned
corporation, the sole shareholder owns 100% of all stock.
65. E.g., Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959).
66. E.g., Burr Oaks v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
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362(a), 6 is the same as it was in the hands of the transferor prior to
the exchange, and, consequently, no gain may be recognized. As pre-
viously discussed, without a gain one cannot obtain the benefits of a
step-up in basis and cannot utilize section 1034's nonrecognition
provision.
Security v. Debt
Whether a promissory note in exchange for property will be
treated as a security or as a debt requires a consideration of several
factors. A promissory note, to be treated as a debt, must have a
fixed-maturity date, fixed-interest payments, no subordination to
general creditors, and no voting rights. 8 Additionally, even if a
promissory note on its face evidences a debt, the length of time to its
maturity will play a key factor in the debt determination. 9
Generally it is recognized that an obligation which matures in five
years or less will likely be treated as a debt.70 The underlying pre-
mise is that the longer the period to maturity, the greater the risk
that the obligation will not be repaid. A high degree of risk is analo-
gous to the continuing proprietary interest of a shareholder because
both the creditor and the shareholder depend upon the venture's con-
tinued success for the repayment of their investment.1 Thus, the dis-
tinction between a long-term debt and a security held by a share-
holder tends to be blurred, inviting challenge from the IRS.
Assuming that a promissory note contains all the indicia of a debt
and is payable within five years, it still may be considered a security
if certain circumstances exist.7 2 In particular, the failure of a related
67. I.R.C. § 362(a) (West 1978).
68. B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 63, 1 4.04, at 4-10; see also I.R.C. §
385(b) (West 1978). Section 385(b) enumerates several factors which the IRS may in-
clude in the Code regulations as guidelines in determining whether an interest in a corpo-
ration is to be treated as indebtedness or stock. The suggested factors are similar to those
cited in the text; however, the IRS thus far has failed to pass any such regulations under
section 385.
69. TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 347, A-33 (1978).
70. Id. at A-34; B. BITrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 63, $ 3.04, at 3-16 to 3-17;
see also Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d 365, 377 n.28 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Adams v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 41, 56-57 (1972); Raich v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 604, 612-13
(1966).
71. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 376-77; United States v. Hertwig, 398 F.2d
452, 455 (5th Cir. 1968); Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 24, 27 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1966); Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d
116, 119 (5th Cir. 1959); Camp Wolters Enters. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 555, 560
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 826 (1956).
72. "The test as to whether notes are securities is not a mechanical determi-
nation of the time period of the note. Though time is an important factor, the
controlling consideration is an overall evaluation of the nature of the debt, de-
gree of participation and continuing interest in the business, the extent of pro-
prietary interest compared with the similarity of the note to a cash payment, the
purpose of the advances, etc .... "
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corporation to pay its shareholder-creditor the principal amount
and/or interest on a promissory note when due is a persuasive factor
in disregarding a debt.7 3 Moreover, a promissory note is likely to be
characterized as a security when the property transferred becomes
the primary earning asset of the corporation and such property fails
to generate enough earnings to cover the expenses and debts accom-
panying the corporation's acquisition.74
In sum, the following factors have been important in persuading a
court that a debt instrument should be treated as a section 351 se-
curity: the instrument lacks one or more of the indicia of a debt; a
maturity date of five years or longer; failure to pay interest and prin-
cipal when due; the property transferred becomes the corporation's
principal earning asset; and, the property transferred fails to gener-
ate enough income to satisfy its debts and expenses.
In the hypothetical facts, T's old residence, which has been con-
verted to rental property, is the primary earning asset of X because
it is X's sole source of income. T's capital contribution of $10,000,
together with X's annual income of $14,400, are not enough to sat-
isfy the annual liabilities consisting of expenses ($5000), interest
owed on the assumed mortgage and issued notes ($25,000), and
principal owed on the issued notes ($40,000). 5 Consequently, X has
only two choices: elect not to pay the principal and interest due on
the notes issued to T or elect to extend the time of maturity on the
issued notes together with avoiding interest payments on the notes.76
But election of either of these alternatives strengthens the security
argument;"7 moreover, the reasoning behind section 351 indicates
that the promissory notes issued to T are section 351 securities. "The
basic premise of section 351 of the Code is that transfers to con-
trolled corporations only work changes in form .... ,,78 Further-
Camp Wolters, 230 F.2d at 560.
73. See, e.g, Aqualane Shores, 269 F.2d at 119; Fleming v. Commissioner, 25
T.C.M. (CCH) 1284, 1290 (1966); cf. I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986) (denies the
taxpayer an interest payment deduction when the interest is owed to a related party but
not actually paid, indicating the lack of a bona fide debt).
74. See, e.g., Fleming, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1290; Burr Oaks, 365 F.2d at 27.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
76. Without the obligation of having to pay either the principal of $40,000 or the
interest of $20,000 per year on each note, X would be able to meet its remaining liabili-
ties - X's annual income of $14,400 is sufficient to meet the yearly expense of $5000
together with annual mortgage interest payments of $5000.
77. "A short-term note . . . will be considered securities in circumstances where
the stated maturity is either unrealistic .. .or is ignored by the parties." D'Angelo
Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121, 135 (1978).
78. Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 114.
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more, one court has stated that
[t]here is, in short, a transfer in form only, a technical transfer not one of
substance. The section is designed to give present tax relief for rearrange-
ments of the taxpayer's own assets, accompanied by no sacrifice of control
and no real generation of income for the owner-and to defer taxation until
a true outside disposition is made.79
X is an "S" corporation, wholly owned and operated by T. By trans-
ferring the property to X, T has not sacrificed control over the prop-
erty; instead, T has maintained a continuing interest in the prop-
erty. 0 Arguably, because of the economic identity between T and X,
T's transfer of the property in exchange for X's promissory notes
lacks any economic substance. Consequently, the transaction is not a
sale of T's assets as required by section 1034, but rather is a mere
rearrangement.
Step Transaction Doctrine
In the event that a debt instrument prevails as a bona fide debt, X
still may be prohibited from utilizing section 1034's nonrecognition
provision if T's transfer of $10,000 for X's stock and transfer of
property for X's promissory notes are treated as two steps of one
transaction. Because of the pervasive nature of the step transaction
doctrine and the uncertainty as to when and if it will apply,"' it is
important to acknowledge the potential application of the doctrine
and its consequences.
The step transaction doctrine is illustrated in Six Seams Com-
pany, Inc. v. United States.8 2 In that case, the Commissioner, con-
tending that the taxpayer's transaction was not a sale but a section
351 transfer, sought to affirm a tax deficiency judgment arising from
the corporate taxpayer's claimed net operating losses. Coiltown, the
taxpayer's sole shareholder and parent corporation, transferred cash
79. Six Seams Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 1975) (emphasis
added).
80. Cf. D'Angelo Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121 (1978). In D'Angelo,
the taxpayer, a corporation, was established for the purpose of purchasing rental property
and equipment from its promoter, D'Angelo. The corporation paid a small amount of the
purchase price in cash, assumed an existing mortgage on the property, and issued an
interest bearing demand note to D'Angelo for the remainder of the purchase price. Sub-
sequently, the corporation proceeded to claim depreciation deductions based on the step-
up in basis obtained by the alleged sale. As of the time of the trial, 16 years after the
demand note was issued, only about 50% of the principal had been paid. The court noted
further that "[a]s a practical matter, payment of the note was intended to be derived
from the rental earnings of the property transferred, a process that would take many
years." Id. at 134-35. Consequently, the tax court held in favor of the Commissioner,
stating: "We believe this record demonstrated a continuing interest by Dr. D'Angelo in
the transferred rental property consistent with the policy underlying the nonrecognition
provisions of section 351 and unlike that contemplated by a sale." Id. at 130.
81. B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 63, 14.51, at 14-130 to 14-132.
82. 524 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1975).
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in exchange for the taxpayer's stock. On the same day, the taxpayer
returned the cash amount to Coiltown under the guise of purchasing
certain property, including mining equipment, from Coiltown. Rec-
ognizing that "[w]ithout the cash infusion by Coiltown, Six Seam
[the taxpayer] would have been unable to 'purchase' the mining
equipment," the court refused to treat the stock-for-cash and cash-
for-property transactions separately so as to compel recognition of
the second transaction as a sale.83 Instead, the court essentially af-
firmed the tax deficiency judgment, holding that the transactions
were merely two steps in an integrated plan to exchange property for
stock - a section 351 transfer.84
It is possible that the cash-for-stock and the property-for-promis-
sory-notes transactions under the hypothetical also may be treated as
a single transaction under section 351 - cash and property in ex-
change for X's stock with the amount of the promissory notes as
"boot."' 15 If this occurs, gain may be recognized up to the value of
the boot.86 Since T's gain of $150,0007 is less than the amount of
boot, $200,000 (value of the promissory notes), T will recognize the
entire $150,000 as gain. When gain is recognized under section 351,
the question arises as to whether the gain will be accorded nonrecog-
nition treatment under section 1034 or denied nonrecognition on the
basis that the two Code provisions are mutually exclusive.
As of the writing of this Comment, no authority has yet supported
either proposition. At least one commentator, however, has suggested
that section 1034 would apply in the instances that gain is recog-
83. Id. at 356.
84. Id.
85. "Boot" commonly is used to refer to "[c]ash or property of a type not in-
cluded in the definition of a nontaxable exchange." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (abr.
5th ed. 1983). Under section 351(a), only stock and securities may be received in ex-
change for T's property in order to qualify as a nontaxable exchange; therefore, since it is
assumed that the promissory notes are not securities-and clearly are not stock-they
are "other property or money" under section 351(b), otherwise referred to as boot.
86. Section 351(b) states:
If subsection (a) would apply to an exchange but for the fact that there is
received, in addition to the stock or securities permitted to be received under
subsection (a), other property or money, then-
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, but not in excess
of-
(A) The amount of money received, plus
(B) the fair market value of such other property received; and
(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
87. Under I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 1982) gain is computed by subtracting the
basis from the sale price. Thus, $250,000 (the sale price to X) minus $100,000 (T's
basis) yields a gain to T in the amount of $150,000.
1173
nized under section 351 (b).88 Because of the lack of authority on this
issue, one must be cognizant of the undesirable possibility, under the
step transaction doctrine, that a Plan-devised transfer may produce a
section 351(b) gain not protected by the nonrecognition provision of
section 1034.
Contribution v. Debt
In addition to contending that a certain transaction is a section
351 security, it is not uncommon for the IRS to argue in the alterna-
tive that the transaction is a capital contribution. Under section
362(a)(2), 89 a determination that a transfer is a capital contribution
will result in the nonrecognition of a purported sale, similar to a sec-
tion 351 exchange.90 The rationale of the capital contribution argu-
ment is that the corporation is thinly capitalized, having a high debt-
to-equity ratio. In these instances, the debt incurred from the acqui-
sition of the property is much greater than the corporation's equity.
When the acquired property is the primary asset of the corporation,
the equity is usually the amount of the corporation's working capital.
Accordingly, the IRS contends that the high debt-to-equity ratio cre-
ates a degree of risk not unlike that of a shareholder's risk, which is
dependent upon the venture's success for the repayment of his
investment.01
It may be observed that a capital contribution argument resembles
a section 351 securities argument. In fact, it has been noted that
courts have not always been careful to distinguish between these two
separate arguments.9 2 Indeed, both arguments require an examina-
tion of substantially the same criteria. In Woolley Equipment Co. v.
United States,9 3 the court enumerated the following factors as indic-
ative of a capital contribution:
The acquiring corporation is usually undercapitalized; the assets involved in
88. TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 348, A-35 to A-36 (1985), states as an observation,
citing no authority:
If a taxpayer transfers his principal residence to a controlled corporation for
stock of the corporation and boot, and an amount equal to the consideration
received by the transferor is reinvested in a new principal residence within the
requisite period, any gain realized which would otherwise be recognized under
§ 351(b) may be protected from recognition by § 1034.
89. I.R.C. § 362(a) (West 1978) states:
If property was acquired after June 22, 1954 by a corporation-
(i) in connection with a transaction to which section 351 (relating to
transfer of property to corporation controlled by transferor) applies, or
(2) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution of capital,
then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor,
increased in the amount of gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer.
90. Id.
91. E.g., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 373.
92. Id. at 372.
93. 268 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Tex. 1966).
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the transfer are usually absolutely essential to the operation of the business
of the new corporation; the debts evidenced by the purchase notes are ordi-
narily subordinated to other debts of the purchaser, or otherwise indicating
something other than normal arms-length creditor safeguards; payments on
the principal are insignificant or not made at all, and no effort is made by
the transferor to compel payment; the maturity date for the notes is inordi-
nately postponed, or the 'interest' is to be paid out of earnings only.94
These enumerated factors are substantially similar to those previ-
ously mentioned in our discussion of section 351 securities.
In cases in which several of the enumerated factors exist, courts
have upheld the IRS capital contribution argument. An illustration
of such a case may be found in Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner.95
In Burr Oaks, the taxpayer, a closely held corporation, was formed
for the purpose of purchasing land from its shareholders in order to
subdivide the land, improve it, and sell lots therefrom. In forming
the corporation, the shareholders transferred a total of $4500 in cash
in exchange for the corporation's stock. The corporation purchased
the shareholders' land by assuming a $30,000 preexisting mortgage
on the land and issuing two-year interest bearing promissory notes in
the amount of $330,000. The tax court found that the sale of lots
was, at best, slow, resulting in the promissory notes not being paid
on time and the maturity date on the notes being extended.96 Fur-
ther, the tax court found that the sale price was more than double
the fair market value of the land at the time of the purchase and
that the corporation had a high debt-to-equity ratio ($360,000/
$4500).97 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the tax
court's findings, held that the transfer of property was not a sale but
an equity contribution. The court stated that "[w]hen the payment
to the transferors is dependent on the success of an untried, under-
capitalized business with uncertain prospects, a strong inference
arises that the transfer is an equity contribution."98
On the other hand, in cases in which the property transferred is
self-liquidating or the activities related to the property are self-in-
come producing, sufficient to pay for the debts incurred, several
courts have upheld the transfer as a sale.99 In Bradshaw v. United
94. Id. at 364-65.
95. 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966).
96. Id. at 26.
97. Id. at 27.
98. Id.
99. E.g., Gyro Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 417 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1969) (in-
volving an involuntary conversion under I.R.C. § 1033 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986), a
nonrecognition provision similar to section 1034); Piedmont v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d
886 (4th Cir. 1968); Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
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States,100 the taxpayer formed a wholly owned corporation for the
purpose of selling to it land which the corporation subsequently
would sell in lots, after subdivision and development. In the forma-
tion of the corporation, the taxpayer transferred an automobile val-
ued at $4500 to the corporation in exchange for the corporation's
stock. On the same day, the taxpayer transferred land to the corpo-
ration in exchange for five interest bearing promissory notes totalling
$250,000 to be repaid over the course of six and one half years. Un-
like the facts in Burr Oaks, in Bradshaw the purchase price repre-
sented the fair market value of the transferred property, the corpora-
tion's prospect for financial success practically was guaranteed and
in fact, such success was realized, and the corporation paid all of the
promissory notes as they came due. With regard to the corporation's
high debt-to-equity ratio ($250,000/$4500), the court stated that
thin capitalization "does not, per se, control the character of the
transaction."' 01 The court stated further that the repayment of the
notes did not depend upon the business' success because the prop-
erty, at all times from the date it was transferred, had a self-liqui-
dating potential for an amount equal to or greater than the total of
the promissory notes. 10 2 Consequently, the court upheld the tax-
payer's characterization of the transfer as a sale, and not as a capital
contribution.0 3
Under the hypothetical, several factors indicate that the property
transfer between T and X may be characterized as a contribution to
capital. First, the transferred property is essential to the operation of
X's venture - it is X's primary earning asset. Second, the prospects
for financial success in X's rental business is nonexistent since the
business produces a loss each year. Third, as was previously observed
in the discussion of section 351 securities, X is likely to default on its
debt payments or postpone the maturity date for the issued notes.
Fourth, X's debt-to-equity ratio at twenty-five to one - $250,000
(debt incurred from the acquisition of the property) divided by
$10,000 (X's equity, that is, the amount of previously contributed
capital) - is extremely high, which clearly indicates that the corpo-
ration is thinly capitalized. Finally, the transferred property is not
likely to be considered self-liquidating, especially when one considers
that the reason for X's existence is the lack of a ready and willing
buyer. Consequently, these factors support an IRS contention that
100. 683 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
101. Id. at 374.
102. Id. at 374-75. The court's conclusion was based both upon the fact that the
property was located in an area in which the need for housing was growing and upon the
fact that the taxpayer had received several purchase offers prior to the development of
the land.
103. Id. at 376.
1176
[VOL. 23: 1157. 1986] Internal Revenue Code Section 1034
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
T's transfer of property to X was not a sale, but in actuality was a
capital contribution. 0
In summary, the IRS is armed with a number of weapons with
which to challenge the characterization of T's property transfer to X
as a sale. If successful, whether the challenge is based upon a section
351 security or a capital contribution (and possibly the step transac-
tion doctrine), the result will be the same: T will be prohibited from
utilizing section 1034's nonrecognition provision, from taking a step-
up in basis for depreciation, and finally from taking a loss deduction
on his individual tax return. 105 Conversely, if the IRS is unsuccess-
ful, T will succeed in securing all of the above mentioned tax bene-
fits. Nevertheless, the benefits may be offset upon the disposition of
the property to a third party.
SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO A THIRD PARTY
Assuming that a Plan-devised corporation satisfies the business
purpose requirement and the initial transfer to the corporation is
characterized as a sale, the Plan is completed when a third party
buyer is found and a corporate sale of the property follows. The tax
consequences which result from the third party sale and the activi-
ties thereafter play an important role in determining the viability of
the Plan. In analyzing these potential tax consequences a distinction
must be made between a corporation's decision to continue in exis-
tence or its decision to liquidate. 106
104. But cf I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1986) (amended in 1984 in reac-
tion to Otey v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1980)). Otey involved facts sup-
porting both a disguised sale between the taxpayer-partner and his partnership, and a
capital contribution. The court decided in favor of the taxpayer, holding the transfer to
be a capital contribution, not a sale. The 1984 amendment could be interpreted as indi-
cating a legislative preference for treating property in exchange for money or other prop-
erty as a sale. Nevertheless, although the partnership and corporate code sections are
analogous in terms of transfers between the entity and its. owners, any legislative prefer-
ence which can be derived from the amendment of section 707(a) may be limited to the
area of partnerships.
105. If the step transaction doctrine is applied, then T may be able to secure both
the nonrecognition provision of section 1034, see supra note 88, as well as the benefits of
a step-up in basis. See I.R.C. § 362(a) (West 1978) (basis of the corporation is increased
from the transferor's basis by the amount of gain recognized by the transferor).
106. Liquidation is the winding up of a corporation by means of settling its liabili-
ties and distributing its remaining assets to its shareholders. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
479 (abr. 5th ed. 1983).
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Continuance of the Corporate Entity
If a Plan-devised corporation elects to remain in existence, it will
have to recognize a gain on its disposition of the property. Conse-
quently, it must be determined whether the gain is ordinary gain or
long-term capital gain.107 This distinction between ordinary income
and capital gain remains necessary even in the event that the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 passes - the Act repeals the special tax treat-
ment afforded to capital gains under section 1202,108 by taxing all
gains as ordinary income-because it is relevant to Code sections
other than merely section 1202.109
Generally, gain derived from -the disposition of property held for
investment 10 or used in the trade or business,111 for a period greater
than six months,112 will be taxed as a capital gain. But when the
gain is derived from the disposition of property held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, it will be taxed
as ordinary income.
113
In determining whether property is held primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of business, the frequency and con-
tinuity of sales has been an important and sometimes principal con-
sideration.114 For instance, in cases in which it is undisputed that the
taxpayer's purpose for acquiring the property was primarily for sale,
a lack of frequency and continuity in sales will persuade a court to
hold that the property was not one held primarily for sale to custom-
ers in the ordinary course of business.' 15 This is so because frequency
and continuity of sales is considered a strong indication that a tax-
payer is in the business of selling the held property; therefore, a sin-
gle sale has been found to be insufficient for characterizing a parcel
107. Capital gain treatment generally is preferable to ordinary gain because, while
ordinary gain is fully taxable, only 40% of the capital gain is subject to tax if the tax-
payer is other than a corporation. I.R.C. § 1202 (West 1982). In our hypothetical, be-
cause X is an "S" corporation, T is taxed directly and thus, as a noncorporate taxpayer,
he is entitled to the 40% treatment.
108. I.R.C. § 1202 (West 1982).
109. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(a) (1986).
110. I.R.C. § 1221 (West 1982).
111. I.R.C. § 1231(a) (West Supp. 1986).
112. I.R.C. § 1222 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
113. I.R.C. § 1221(1) (West 1982).
114. Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 178 (5th Cir. 1980);
Parkside, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1977); Biedenharn Realty
Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1976).
Other factors to consider may include:
the extent and nature of the taxpayer's efforts to sell the property; the extent of
subdividing, developing, and advertising to increase sales; the use of a business
office for the sale of the property; the character and degree of supervision or
control exercised by the taxpayer over any representative selling the property;
and the time and effort the taxpayer habitually devoted to the sales.
United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969).
115. Winthrop, 417 F.2d at 911.
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of property as being held primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of business."1 6 Thus, a Plan-devised corporation with
only one sale, of which the property sold was used in the purported
business of renting, is likely to be accorded a capital gain. 117
Generally, although a gain from the disposition of property ini-
tially may be treated as a capital gain, portions of the gain still may
be taxed as ordinary income under section 1250.118 Section 1250 es-
sentially provides for the recapture of past depreciation deductions in
excess of the amount allowed under the straight-line method1 9 by
requiring the taxpayer-seller to claim as ordinary income an amount
of the gain equal to that of the excess depreciation taken.1 20 Section
1250 applies to depreciable buildings, such as houses used for rental
purposes.1 21 However, section 1250 is inapplicable since depreciation
deductions were taken in accordance with the straight-line method
resulting in no excess depreciation.
After disposition of its sole asset, a Plan-devised corporation may
proceed to engage in any form of business it so elects. But if the
corporation retains its earnings and reinvests in certain passive in-
vestments,1 22 it will be subject to a personal-holding company tax of
fifty percent on its undistributed income.123 Caution therefore must
116. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 120, 126-27 (1966).
117. For purposes of this section we are assuming that the property transfer from
T to X properly was characterized as a sale. Also, it is assumed that X held the property
for three years. Thus, X's basis in the property is $220,000-$200,000 in promissory
notes plus the assumption of a $50,000 mortgage, see supra note 14, minus three years
depreciation of $30,000. See I.R.C. § 1016 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). If it is further
assumed that X sells the property to the third party buyer for $270,000 (including the
amount of mortgage assumed by the buyer), the gain subject to tax is $50,000 ($270,000
minus $220,000). Because X is an "S" corporation, the gain passes thru to T, the sole
shareholder, and as discussed in the text, it likely would be treated as a capital gain and
taxed at 40%. Moreover, because X is a new corporation which has operated as an "S"
corporation throughout its entire existence, it is not subject to the minimum tax provision
of I.R.C. § 56 (West 1984 & Supp. 1986). See I.R.C. § 1363(a) (West Supp. 1986);
I.R.C. § 58(d) (West 1984); I.R.C. § 1374(c)(2) (West Supp. 1986). In the event that
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 passes, see H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 701 (1986)
for changes to the minimum tax provisions.
118. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
119. Id. § 1250(b)(5).
120. Id. § 1250(a).
121. See supra note 12.
122. I.R.C. § 543 (West 1967 & Supp. 1986). Passive investments which are sub-
ject to a personal-holding-company tax include stocks of other corporations which pay
dividends, and certain rent-producing properties in which the rent constitutes less than
50% of the corporation's adjusted ordinary gross income or is greater than 50% but less
than the amount of the computed personal-holding-company income which exceeds 10%
of the corporation's ordinary gross income for the taxable year. See id. § 543(a)(1), (2).
123. I.R.C. § 541 (West Supp. 1986); I.R.C. § 542 (West 1967 & Supp. 1986).
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be exercised when considering the corporation's future operation or
else the tax savings obtained under the Plan may be defeated.
Liquidation of the Corporation
After disposition of the property, the taxpayer may prefer to liqui-
date the corporation, having no further use for its existence. The tax
consequences of liquidation can best be illustrated by using the hypo-
thetical facts set forth at the beginning of the Comment.
Assume after three years of renting the property X receives
$225,000 in cash from the sale of the property in addition to the
buyer's assumption of the original mortgage (assuming the outstand-
ing principal amount due is $45,000). In pursuit of liquidation, X
pays T the entire amount of $200,000 owed on the promissory notes.
The $200,000 represents the repayment of a debt of which only
$150,000 is gain to T and is not recognized under section 1034.124
X's gain from the disposition is $50,000.125 Under section 337(a), 26
X would not have to pay taxes on the gain if X, under a plan of
liquidation, liquidated within twelve months of the sale.127 But note
that if the Tax Reform Act of 1986 passes, section 337(a) will be
repealed. 128 Furthermore, under section 331,128 X's distribution of
$50,000 to T, as X's sole shareholder, is treated as an exchange for
stock, not a distribution of dividends. Thus, after deducting $10,000
for T's basis in the stock, 130 $40,000 of the gain is taxed to T as
long-term capital gain instead of ordinary income.
131
The favorable tax provisions of sections 337 and 331 will not ap-
ply, however, if X is considered a collapsible corporation under sec-
tion 341 .132 If X is considered a collapsible corporation, X will be
But see H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 104(b)(8) (1986) which would lower the rate
to 38.5% for the 1987 tax year and 28% for all taxable years thereafter.
124. See supra note 2.
125. See supra note 117.
126. I.R.C. § 337(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1986).
127. Id.
128. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 631(a) (1986) (repeal of section 337 re-
sults in gain recognized to the corporation except in limited circumstances).
129. I.R.C. § 331 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986).
130. I.R.C. § 358(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1986) (stock in exchange for money is a
section 351 transfer subject to the'basis provision of section 358).
131. See I.R.C. § 1221 (West 1982) (defining capital asset); I.R.C. § 1222 (West
1982 & Supp. 1986) (defining long-term capital gain); I.R.C. § 1202 (West 1982) (stat-
ing that only 40% of the gain is taxable). But see supra text accompanying note 108 for
the possible repeal of capital gain treatment altogether.
132. I.R.C. § 341 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986). The essential characteristics of a
collapsible corporation which pertain to our discussion are: (a) the corporation is formed
principally for the manufacture, construction, production, or purchase of property; (b)
the corporation purchases property which is used in its trade or business, or which is held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business; (c) the
corporation has not yet realized a substantial part of the gain; and (d) the taxable gain
derived from the property is realized by the shareholders, not the corporation, through a
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taxed on the $50,000 gain 3' and the subsequent distribution to T
will be treated as ordinary income.3 However, section 341 only ap-
plies to property held for less than three years;135 therefore, because
X had held the property for three years before selling it, X is not
subject to section 341. Consequently, the nonrecognition provision of
section 337 and the capital gain allowance of section 331 continue to
apply.
Additionally, section 337 does not supersede the section 1250 re-
capture requirement. 3 6 But since X had not taken excess deprecia-
tion prior to the disposition of the property, no recapture of previous
depreciation deductions is necessary.
It is apparent that the disposition of the property may lead to un-
desirable tax consequences which may serve to offset the benefits de-
rived from implementing the Plan. But if the corporation is careful
by not taking excess depreciation throughout the years of operation,
holding the property for three years or more, and, in the event it
elects to remain in operation, not reinvesting in certain passive in-
vestments, the viability of the Plan from its inception to the closing
of the corporation's affairs may be preserved. Nevertheless, despite
the Plan's apparent economic viability, it is the legitimacy of the
Plan that determines its overall viability.
LETTER RULING 8350084
Proponents of the Plan cite IRS Letter Ruling 8350084 (Rul-
ing) 13 7 in support of its legitimacy. The facts in the Ruling involved
a proposed sale of the taxpayer's old residence to his wholly owned
corporation. In the hands of the corporation, the property would be
depreciable. The issue was whether section 1239138 applied to the
transfer so as to preclude utilization of section 1034.
Section 1239 requires that in situations in which property is trans-
preconceived plan of liquidation. Id. § 341(b)(1).
133. I.R.C. § 337(c)(1) (West 1978 & Supp. 1986) (precluding collapsible corpo-
rations from obtaining nonrecognition for gain derived from the disposition of property).
134. I.R.C. § 341(a) (West 1978 & Supp 1986).
135. Id. § 341(b)(3). In the event that a Plan-devised corporation holds the prop-
erty for less than three years before disposition, subsection (e) indicates the exceptions to
the application of subsection (a).
136. I.R.C. § 1250(i) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) ("This section shall apply not-
withstanding any other provision of this subtitle.").
137. LTR 8350084 (September 13, 1983). Although a letter ruling does not carry
procedential weight, it often may indicate the likely future treatment by the IRS of a
similar situation.
138. I.R.C. § 1239 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
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ferred to a related party, which includes a taxpayer and his wholly
owned corporation, and such property is depreciable in the hands of
the transferee, the transferor must recognize the gain as ordinary
income and not as capital gain. 139 The IRS ruled that section 1239
would not apply until the taxpayer sold his new residence.1 40 The
IRS ruling was premised on the observation that section 1034 did
not specifically prohibit sales between related parties; therefore, if all
other requirements are met, the application of section 1034 is
mandatory. 41
Although the Ruling seems to support the argument that a trans-
fer to a wholly owned corporation is a legitimate and bona fide sale
subject to the nonrecognition provision of section 1034, the Ruling
does not disclose the nature of the taxpayer's corporation nor does it
address the potential applicability of section 351. The corporation
very well could have been an existing corporation prior to the time of
transfer and in the business of renting or selling homes, or it could
have been newly formed for the purpose of the single sale. If the
nature of the corporation was the latter, the facts in the Ruling be-
come substantially similar to the layout of the Plan so as to lend
support to the legitimacy of the Plan. But if the nature of the corpo-
ration was the former situation, the facts would be considerably dis-
tinguishable from a Plan-devised corporation since the corporation in
the Ruling was a preexisting corporation, perhaps already in the bus-
iness of renting or selling residential property - an indication of a
legitimate corporation with a legitimate business purpose.
In addition to the ambiguity surrounding the nature of the tax-
payer's wholly owned corporation, the IRS stated that "[n]o opinion
[was] expressed as to the federal income tax consequences of the
proposed transaction under the provisions of any other section of the
Code."' 14 2 Since the applicability of section 351 was not raised as an
issue in the Ruling, the characterization of the transfer as a section
351 exchange still is plausible, if not inevitable. Consequently, it re-
mains uncertain whether the IRS will leave unchallenged a pur-
ported sale involving a new corporation formed for the purpose of
the single sale, especially in light of the extremely favorable tax ben-
efits inherent in the Plan.
139. Id. See supra note 15.
140. "[[]f the new residence is later sold and gain recognized, that gain will be
recognized as ordinary income to the extent of the gain that would have been ordinary
income were it not deferred upon this sale under section 1034 of the Code." LTR
8350084 (September 13, 1983).
141. The mandatory nature of section 1034 can be found in Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-
l(a) (1956).
142. LTR 8350084 (September 13, 1983).
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CONCLUSION
The sale-to-a-related-corporation tax Plan is a risky means of cir-
cumventing the two-year limitation provision of section 1034. The
Plan requires the formation of a legitimately recognized corporation,
but that corporation is likely to be disregarded under the sham
transaction doctrine. Furthermore, the Plan necessitates that the
transfer between the transferor-shareholder and his Plan-devised cor-
poration be characterized as a sale. The IRS, however, is likely to
characterize the transfer as a section 351 exchange or capital contri-
bution. Finally, although proponents of the Plan cite to Letter Rul-
ing 8350084 as supporting the legitimacy of the Plan, a closer analy-
sis indicates that such a conclusion is premature.
In addition to the questionable viability of the Plan under the pre-
sent tax code, if the Tax Reform Act of 1986143 becomes law, the
tax savings intended under the Plan will be reduced substantially. In
particular, depreciation deductions will be limited to the straight-line
method over a longer period of years, thereby lessening the amount
of depreciation deductible;. 4 losses from rental activities generally
will not be deductible for taxpayers grossing more than $150,000 per
year until all interest in the rental activity is disposed; 145 the distinc-
tion between capital gains and ordinary income will be eliminated
with regard to special tax treatment;146 and, the nonrecognition of
gains to corporations liquidating under section 337 will be re-
pealed. 147 Consequently, not only is the Plan an inviable tax strategy
under the current tax code, but in the event that the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 becomes law, the tax saving measures intended under
the Plan may be so substantially reduced that the benefits of a suc-
cessful implementation may be all but nonexistent.
ADDENDUM
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was signed into law on October 22,
1986. When integrated with the old tax code provisions it will be
referred to as The Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
As it pertains to the Comment's hypothetical, the new 1986 Code
will effect the following changes. First, since under new Code section
469 business and interest expenses are excluded in the determination
143. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
144. See supra note 12.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
147. See supra note 128.
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of a passive activity's income or losses, X's only deduction is for de-
preciation ($10,000). Thus, X's $25,600 loss, as determined under
the pre-1986 Code, is transformed into a gain of $4400 (rental in-
come of $14,400 minus $10,000 depreciation) under the new 1986
Code.
Second, although under the new 1986 Code, depreciation gener-
ally is limited to the straight-line method over 27.5 years in the case
of residential property, it does not apply to pre-1981 property which
subsequently is acquired by a related party such as X, a wholly
owned corporation. Consequently, X's depreciation deduction of
$10,000, as determined under the straight-line method over a useful
life of 25 years, remains unchanged.
Third, because of the repeal of section 337 under the new 1986
Code, double taxation occurs upon X's disposition of the residential
property. In particular, X's $50,000 gain is taxed to X at the time of
the sale as well as to T upon distribution of X's assets in accordance
with X's liquidation.
Finally, because the new 1986 Code eliminates special tax treat-
ment for capital gains, the $50,000 gain recognized by X upon dis-
position of the residential property and later by T upon X's distribu-
tion of assets pursuant to a liquidation, is taxed as ordinary income.
As illustrated above, the new 1986 Code, especially section 469,
will reduce substantially and in some cases, defeat entirely, the
Plan's economic viability.
MARY TSENG
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